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Abstract
We analyze decisions of firms on outsourcing of intermediate goods and R&D investment.
If firms choose in-house production, a high profit discount is incurred due to the inefficiency of
producing the intermediate goods, whereas if firms search for and outsource to specialists, the
production costs decrease, but an imitation risk arises by specialists, who may become competi-
tors in the final-good market. Accordingly, patents are used to mitigate this possibility, which
are costly. We show that in outsourcing, all firms outsource to the same specialist to minimize
the possibility of successful imitation in equilibrium. Moreover, firms still invest in R&D ac-
tivities and outsource their intermediate goods with some patent protection even though the
selected specialist put effort into imitation.
JEL classification: D21; D23. Keywords: Patents; Outsourcing; Imitation.
1 Introduction
Outsourcing has been widely used by firms in many industries as a prevalent way to reduce
production costs and increase profits. By outsourcing the intermediate-good production (even the
whole production process) to intermediate-good specialized producers (henceforth specialists), firms
can lower production costs and spend more on R&D activities, which consequently increases their
profits. At the same time, outsourcing is also socially preferred, as it organizes production of both
intermediate and final goods more efficiently and thus generates higher productivity with lower
social costs.
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However, a vast amount of literature illustrates different issues on outsourcing. Specifically,
information leakage has been addressed recently as one of the most important aspects of outsourc-
ing.1 In outsourcing, before intermediate good production, firms may have to disclose the whole or
partial details of the product to specialists, in particular, technology and assembling requirements.
In this case, information leakage, which is not only related to the core technology of the product,
but also the design and other aspects of the product, becomes unavoidable. Once the details of
the product have been delivered, it becomes difficult for firms to monitor how specialists use the
information. Even if it is possible to monitor, a high cost would be incurred by firms.
Information leakage may give an opportunity for intermediate-good specialized producers to
learn and imitate the firms’ products (core technology and product designs), and this is difficult
for firms to verify. Even if firms keep details of the product in secrecy, it is still relatively easy
for specialists to do reverse engineering when they obtain partially disclosed information. Success-
ful imitation not only provides specialists an opportunity for “free riding”, but also a chance to
become rivals to compete with firms in the final-product market. A typical example of imitation
by specialists can be seen in the consumer electronic industry. During the 1960s and 1970s, out-
sourcing of intermediate goods was ubiquitous among American electronic companies as one of the
cost reduction strategies. Firms such as Emerson Radio, RCA, Zenith, and Magnavox outsourced
their intermediate-good production to some Japanese companies, in order to gain the benefit of
low labor costs in production. However, after obtaining technological competency, the Japanese
companies launched their own R&D to imitate the products, and then market competition between
the American and Japanese firms started when these Japanese firms successfully imitated and sold
their final products back to the U.S. market. By the end of the 1960s, the number of Japanese
companies significantly outweighed the U.S ones in this industry.2
In this article, we model the tradeoff for firms between outsourcing intermediate goods and pro-
tecting the secrecy of the product information. In a monopolistically competitive market, all firms
invest in cost-cutting technology and choose to either outsource or produce in house their interme-
diate goods. On the one hand, if firms choose in-house production, a relatively high profit discount
is incurred to produce the intermediate goods by themselves due to the inefficiency of intermediate-
good production, which lowers firms’ profits in the market. On the other hand, if firms search
for and outsource to intermediate-good specialists, they can reduce the costs in intermediate-good
production, but have to face the risk of imitation by specialists who may accordingly become com-
petitors in the final-good market. For simplicity, we assume that if specialists imitate successfully,
then they can produce similar products without infringement, and the new similar products and
the original products of firms are substitutes to consumers in the final-good market. Consequently,
1Besides this, a mushrooming amount of literature related to solving the “hold-up problem” has also been created.
2Partner (1999) and Kotabe, Mol, and Ketkar (2008) give more details and examples of outsourcing, imitation
and final product competition between the U.S. and Japanese electronic firms.
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each firm has to manufacture the intermediate inputs by itself, which surely reduces firms’ market
shares and profits. After the intermediate goods are produced, no matter whether by specialists
or in-house production, each firm assembles them with final parts produced by itself, and sells the
final products in the final-good market.3
As discussed above, the possibility of imitation by specialists is a crucial concern when firms
make the decision on outsourcing. It may be argued that this imitation would potentially enforce
technology diffusion and competition in the final-good market, from which consumers would benefit.
However, this possibility decreases the ex ante incentive for firms to outsource and invest in R&D,
or even causes them to choose production in house which increases the social cost of production.
Therefore, it becomes necessary for firms to protect their production information in order to reduce
the possibility of imitation in outsourcing .
In our model, we introduce the standard property right protection method – patents – to
protect the final products before outsourcing intermediate goods. Throughout this article, patent
protection is a broader concept than is commonly used. Patents are used not only for technology
protection, but also other aspects which are particularly related to the product, such as model design
and appearance design. By rewarding this exclusive property right, obviously, even though patents
cannot entirely eliminate the possibility of successful imitation in outsourcing, they can increase the
cost and difficulty of imitation, and hence R&D activities are encouraged in outsourcing. This effect
discourages specialists from putting effort into imitation, and then mitigates the corresponding
possibility. However, patenting is not an easy task and the cost associated with this activity
has to be paid by patent applicants. This cost includes money and time in investigating the
complexity of the product, and the patenting process. Lemley (2001) lists specific application fees
and estimating fees for patent protection, and shows that the patenting cost is not trivial for patent
applicants. Thus, when firms choose patents to protect their outsourced production in outsourcing,
the patenting cost is an important variable that cannot be ignored.4
Given that costly patent protection can be used in outsourcing, we separately study firms’
strategies in patent protection and R&D investment, and the imitation strategy of specialists. We
show that there exists a unique solution in equilibrium such that each firm still invests in R&D
activities and outsources its intermediate goods with a certain degree of patent protection, even
though specialists will put some effort into imitation and the possibility of successful imitation in
outsourcing is positive.
Furthermore, we also analyze the searching strategy of firms in the outsourcing market. Rather
than matching different specialists, our model gives a more intuitive prediction that firms who
compete in a final-good market often coordinately hire the same intermediate-good specialist. This
3In fact, firms can also outsource their sales and marketing to specialists, but it is beyond the scope of our article.
Thus, in the model we still assume that firms are involved in market competition of final goods.
4In the reality of patenting, the relevant costs are increasing as the patented innovations become more complicated.
See http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee2009september15.htm for more details.
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is because by using the same specialist, firms can minimize information leakage, the number of
potential imitators and the probability of successful imitation. Moreover, this prediction is also
consistent with the observations in outsourcing markets.5 One typical example is described in Dean
(2007)’s report: Foxconn Technology Group, one of the biggest Original Equipment Manufacturers
(OEM) in the manufacture of electronics and computer components, does outsourcing of desktop
PCs/parts for Dell and Hewlett-Packard, who are competitors in the personal computer market;
Iphone for Apple, and cellphones/parts for Motorolla and Nokia, who are competitors in the mobile
market; and lastly PlayStation2 video game consoles and PSP handheld game units for Sony, and
Wii videogame consoles and DS game units for Nintendo, who are competitors in the video game
market.
Looking backward to the stage of “outsourcing or in house production”, we discuss the variables
that determine firms’ decision on outsourcing. As can be seen above, reducing production cost is
one of the main reasons to conduct outsourcing. We show that the magnitude of the profit discount
(inefficiency) of intermediate-good production for firms plays an important role in the outsourcing
decision. If the degree of inefficiency in producing intermediate goods in house is high enough for
firms, then even if there exists a positive probability of successful imitation by the specialist, firms
are still willing to take the risk and choose to outsource their intermediate goods.
Lastly, we analyze the effect of the patenting cost on the outsourcing market and policy im-
plications. In fact, besides the essential social cost related to patenting, charging a fee (as part
of the patenting cost) as an important method to encourage R&D activities has also been utilized
by policymakers. Hunt (1999), U.S. Federal Trade Commission (2003) and Hunt (2006) show that
adding a patent fee/tax or raising the requirements for award of patents can increase the difficulty
and costs for firms of obtaining patent protection, and thus change the incentive for innovation.
Our model suggests that a reasonable level of patenting cost may need to be imposed to maximize
social welfare.
1.1 Related literature
The “make-or-buy” decision as the boundary of a firm was originally studied by Coase (1937),
and beginning with Williamson (1975, 1985), a mushrooming amount of literature has been created
to solve this decision-making problem.6 This literature mainly focuses on the bilateral relationship,
specifically, on the “hold-up problem”, which is caused by specific rights over assets and incomplete
contracts. Seminal articles on this issue include Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Grossman
5Baccara (2007) also shows this concentration in outsourcing markets. However, our interpretation differs from
hers. In her model, when a firm outsources its technological production process to a specialized producer (contractor),
“other firms may have an incentive to hire the same contractors to have access to that information (technology)”.
6A similar issue about whether to conduct international outsourcing or domestic production in the literature of
international trade has also been discussed. More details can be seen in Antra`s (2003), Antra`s and Helpman (2004),
Antra`s (2005) and Grossman and Helpman (2005).
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and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Aghion and Tirole (1994). Focusing on the same
issue but using a different modeling approach, Grossman and Helpman (2002) construct a general
equilibrium model to explore the “make-or-buy” decision in an industrial structure. Their model
provides an intuitive method to study the interdependence among firms and industrial structure
when outsourcing is conducted. However, according to Holmstro¨m and Roberts (1998), the current
explanation for the boundary of a firm may be too limited for a general case.
Information leakage has been considered recently as another important aspect of the decision
on “outsourcing or in-house production” for intermediate goods. Baccara (2007) considers the
implications of information leakage in an outsourcing market when firms outsource their professional
tasks to external contractors. She claims that information leakage concentrates the outsourcing
market to a single contractor, which induces a monopoly information market. Lai, Riezman, and
Wang (2009) study the outsourcing of innovation from firms to research subcontractors. They
show that information leakage reduces the incentive for R&D outsourcing, and also suggest that
the incentive for R&D outsourcing and economic efficiency can be increased by using stronger
protection of trade secrecy.
Although the modeling framework and the discussed points are not the same, our article shares
the common view of these articles that when outsourcing is conducted, specialists may make unver-
ified profits from involuntary information leakage. Besides this, we consider a further step that, by
using information leakage from firms, specialists may imitate the final product and become market
competitors against firms. In addition, we investigate how firms make the ex ante decision on
“outsourcing or in-house production”, and if outsourcing is conducted, how much R&D investment
and how strong patent protection should be implemented by firms to mitigate the possibility of
imitation. Furthermore, we also discuss the policy implication of patent protection in outsourcing.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the setup of the
model. In Section 3, we show the unique solution of R&D investment, number of patents of firms
and imitation effort of specialists, when outsourcing is conducted, and the decision making on
“outsourcing or in-house production” is analyzed. Section 4 discusses the policy implications of the
patenting cost. Section 5 concludes, and the Appendix including the proofs of propositions follows.
2 The model
Firms. Consider a monopolistically competitive market with m firms, where m is a finite
number, each of whom faces a downward sloping inverse demand curve y(p). For convenience,
we assume that the functional form of the demand curve has the property of constant elasticity:
y = Amp−, where  ∈ (1,∞) represents the absolute price elasticity of the demand for goods, and
Am is the scaling constant which represents the market size captured by the firm. Am decreases
when there are more firms in the final-good market (m increases). Furthermore, we assume that the
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monopolistically competitive firms produce final goods with a constant marginal cost µ. Therefore,
the profit of a typical firm can be written as pi = y[p − µ] = Amp−[p − µ]. Denoting that
α ≡ 1 − 1/ and after maximizing pi with respect to p, the equilibrium price and quantity for the
goods are p∗ = µ/α and y∗ = Am(µ/α)−
1
1−α respectively, implying that the maximized market
profit of the firm is pi∗ = Rmµ−
α
1−α , where Rm ≡ Am(1− α)(1/α)−
α
1−α .
Moreover, we consider a cost-cutting technology of producing final goods regarding to this
market profit function. Let λ denote the proportion of reduction in the marginal cost µ, where
λ ∈ (0, 1]. In other words, λ represents the measurement of progress in the cost-cutting technology
of final-good production. Then, we can rewrite the market profit of the firm with technological
progress in final goods as follows: pi∗(λ) = Rm(µλ)−
α
1−α . For computational simplicity, we define
k = (µλ)−
α
1−α , and call it the R&D-activity level. Obviously, as λ decreases, k and pi∗ increase. In
the market, λ is one of the variables that the firm has to endogenously decide in its strategy profile.
Moreover, λ is one-to-one mapping to the R&D-activity level k. Thus, in this article, we only need
to focus on the R&D-activity level k, and assume that to achieve k, an increasingly convex cost
f(k) has to be incurred, where f ′(k) > 0, f ′′(k) > 0 and f(µ−
α
1−α ) = 0.7
To complete and sell the products in the market, two compulsory components should be pro-
duced: intermediate and final goods, which are combined according to a fixed ratio. At the be-
ginning, only firms have capability to produce final goods. For convenience, we assume that firms
assemble the two components (intermediate and final goods) with zero cost. Firms have two options
to organize the production of intermediate goods: either to produce them in house or outsource
them to specialists.
If the firm, denoted as H, chooses in-house production, a proportion of its market profit has to
be paid for intermediate-good production due to the inefficiency of in-house production compared
to using specialists, namely (1−δ)Rmk, where δ is the fixed discounting factor and δ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus,
in this case, the market profit of H is given by δRmk.
If outsourcing occurs, H has to search for and outsource its intermediate goods to a specialist.
In the outsourcing market, information leakage cannot be avoided. Therefore, before technology
delivery, patents will be used to protect the outsourced products. Let n denote the number of
patents and each patent costs c > 0, where n ∈ [0,∞). Then the total patenting costs are nc. Note
that this patent protection system includes all aspects of the products, namely, it includes not only
the cost reduction technology innovated by the R&D investment of firms, but also other aspects of
the products, such as appearance and model designs. To simplify the model, we also assume that
there does not exist patent overlapping problem among firms.8
7Note that each firm may or may not have an identical technology in cost reduction, but the technologies that
they adopt generate the same effect to their marginal cost, reflected by the setup that they have the same µ and
innovation cost function f(k).
8Hunt (2006) considers a case where R&D investment among firms may decrease when there exists patent over-
lapping.
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Specialists. The outsourcing market consists of q identical specialized intermediate-good pro-
ducers, where q is a finite number. We normalize the production cost of intermediate goods of the
specialists to be zero. Let O denote the intermediate-good specialist selected by H. When out-
sourcing is conducted, H discloses the product requirements and (partial) details to the specialist
O, but there are no ex ante enforceable contracts between them.9 After obtaining the (partial)
product details, and before producing the intermediate goods, O can put effort θ into imitating the
outsourced products. This imitation is associated with cost g(θ), which is an increasingly convex
function: g(θ) = 12cθθ
2, where cθ > 0.10
The probability of successful imitation, denoted as P , is endogenously determined by two factors:
the number of patents n from H and the imitation effort θ from O. On the one hand, the more
patents (n) a firm applies, the lower probability (P ) the imitation can succeed. On the other hand,
if the specialist contributes more θ to imitation, this probability (P ) should increase. Therefore,
in order to capture both effects, we assume that the probability of successful imitation is governed
by the function:
P (n, θ) = bθe−γn, ∀ n, θ, (1)
where b and γ are scaling constants, so that P ∈ [0, 1]. With probability P , O successfully imitates
H’s products and then it enters the final-good market and produces substitutes against H’s without
infringement. In this case, O becomes a competitor in the final-good market and H has to produce
the intermediate goods by itself. With probability 1 − P , O fails in imitation and has to follow
the outsourcing instruction to manufacture the intermediate goods. After completing and selling
the products in the market, H and O split the market profits by fractions β and 1 − β in a Nash
bargaining game, where β ∈ (0, 1).
Furthermore, in order to solve the model, we make the following two assumptions:
Assumption 1. (1− β)mRm < Rm+1.
Assumption 2. β > δ.
The first assumption ensures that O has sufficient incentive to invest in imitation. Otherwise,
O puts θ = 0 and H does not do patenting (n = 0), and thus outsourcing will be the equilibrium
outcome because there is no possibility of imitation. The second assumption guarantees that
outsourcing is always preferred to production in house by H if there is no information leakage and
imitation. Moreover, in this case, patent protection becomes unnecessary.
9The setting of no ex ante enforceable contracts in outsourcing and its explanation can be seen in Antra`s (2003),
Antra`s and Helpman (2004), Antra`s (2005) and Grossman and Helpman (2005).
10Imitation is not entirely free for specialists, and imitation costs, which could incur a large amount of expenditure,
have to be paid, including expert training fees, imitation experiment fees, and so on. A related article can be seen in
Gallini (1992), who studies costly imitation in patented technology.
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Figure 1: The Game Tree
Timing of the game. The timing of the game is illustrated in Figure 1. At the first stage, each
firm (H) decides to choose either outsourcing or in-house production for its intermediate goods. If
H chooses production in house, then it decides the R&D-activity level k and incurs the proportion
1 − δ of the market profit to produce the intermediate goods. By combining the self-produced
goods, H produces the final goods and obtains the payoff in the m-firm market (a final product
market with m competitors). If H chooses outsourcing, it firstly searches for a specialist (O), and
then decides the R&D-activity level k and the number of patents n. Next, this firm transfers the
technology, the blue prints and the requirements of intermediate goods to the selected specialist.
At the second stage, O invests θ to imitate the whole products of H. If imitation is successful,
there will have one more competitor engaged in the final-good market competition. In this case, H
needs to produce the intermediate goods by itself. If imitation fails, H and O operate a Nash bar-
gaining game with fractions β and 1−β, respectively, over the market profit, after all intermediate
goods are produced and the final goods are completed and sold.
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3 The equilibrium
3.1 Search, R&D investment, patents and imitation in outsourcing
In this section, we focus on a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium and use backward induc-
tion to solve the game. Before we obtain the equilibrium values of k, n and θ in outsourcing, it is
important to investigate how a firm searches for a specialist in the outsourcing market. Therefore,
along the equilibrium path of outsourcing, we claim that:
Proposition 1. No matter which search procedure a firm uses to match a specialist, if patent
protection is costly, in equilibrium it is optimal for all firms to outsource their intermediate goods
to a single specialist in the outsourcing market.11
The proof is straightforward. Given a non-trivial patenting cost c, the probability of successful
imitation is greater than zero, P > 0. Suppose that q specialists have been selected by all firms
in outsourcing market, and then the probability of all q specialists failing in imitation is (1− P )q.
Therefore, the probability that at least one of the specialists has successful imitation and thus
becomes a competitor in the final-good market is 1 − (1 − P )q. However, if all firms outsource
to a single specialist, then the probability for this specialist being successful in imitation is only
P . Obviously, 1 − (1 − P )q > P . Therefore, it is optimal for all firms to outsource to the same
specialist.
This result shares the same prediction in Baccara (2007), but the implications are different. In
her model, the main incentive for a firm to choose the same specialist is to gain information leakage
(technology) from other firms. However, we show that costly patent protection is another reason
why we observe concentration in an outsourcing market. When patenting costs have to be paid, the
number of patents a firm can use to protect the outsourced products becomes limited. Then, in order
to minimize the possibility of successful imitation by specialists, prevent new entry in the final-good
market and maintain the market profits as large as possible, all firms have to coordinately select the
same intermediate-good specialist, as in the example discussed in the Introduction. Furthermore,
it is also obvious to see that if the patenting cost is zero, we have the following strategy where all
firms will play in the outsourcing market:
Corollary 1. If c = 0, firms apply for an infinite number of patents and outsourcing of their inter-
mediate goods is always preferred. Moreover, there is no “concentrated” specialist in the outsourcing
market.
If c = 0, n approaches infinity. Then θ = 0 and P = 0. Therefore, the probability that there
exists at least one specialist who successfully imitates the firms’ technology is given by 1−(1−P )q =
11To simplify the formation of the outsourcing market, we assume that the specialists who are not searched for by
the firms leave the outsourcing market.
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0, which is equivalent to the probability of successful imitation when only a single specialist is
selected. Thus, if outsourcing is chosen in this case, the firms are indifferent in outsourcing to one
or more than one specialists.
Now we turn to investigate the strategy profile (k, n, θ) for the firms and the specialist when out-
sourcing is conducted. Given H’s searching strategy, when outsourcing occurs, the payoff function
for H under the patent scheme is:
max
k,n
H = k[PδRm+1 + (1− P )βRm]− nc− f(k), (2)
where c is the unit cost for patenting, Rm+1 denotes the scaling constant of the market profit for
each final-good competitor when O imitates successfully, and there are m+1 firms in the final-good
market. In contrast, the payoff function for O under patent scheme is presented as:
max
θ
O = k[PRm+1 + (1− P )(1− β)mRm]− g(θ), (3)
recalling that P = bθe−γn, g(θ) is the imitation cost incurred by O, and O simultaneously does
outsourcing of intermediate goods for m firms if its imitation fails. Therefore, solving the game by
backward induction yields:
Proposition 2. If outsourcing is conducted in equilibrium, all firms outsource their intermediate
goods to the same specialist, and there exists a unique solution such that each firm conducts R&D-
activity level k∗ and chooses n∗ patents, and the specialist puts θ∗ into imitation. In this equilibrium,
the probability of successful imitation is positive, namely, P ∗ = bθ∗e−γn∗ > 0, where n∗, k∗ and θ∗
are uniquely determined by the following equation system:
θ∗ =
be−γn∗k∗[Rm+1 − (1− β)mRm]
cθ
, (4)
−2γe−2γn∗(k∗)2τ = c, (5)
and
2e−2γn
∗
k∗τ + βRm = f ′(k∗), (6)
where τ = b
2(Rm+1−(1−β)mRm)(δRm+1−βRm)
cθ
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 shows the behaviors of all firms and the selected specialist in the outsourcing
market. In this equilibrium, even though imitation from the specialist cannot be completely forbid-
den, R&D activities can still be conducted in outsourcing. Of course, patent protection becomes
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necessary for the firms to implement R&D activities.
As we have seen above, in outsourcing, the patenting cost plays an important role in not only
the search strategy of the firms, but also their level of patent protection in R&D activities. Thus,
in the following, we check the effects of the patenting cost c on θ, k and P , when outsourcing is
chosen in equilibrium. equations (4), (5) and (6) yield the following proposition:
Proposition 3. In equilibrium where outsourcing is conducted, an increase in the patenting cost c
induces: (a) a decrease in the R&D-activity level k; (b) an increase in the imitation effort θ; and
(c) an increase in probability P .
Proof. See the Appendix.
It is easy to understand the intuition in Proposition 3. When the patenting cost increases, it
becomes more costly for the firms to obtain patent protection, which makes the R&D activities
more insecure from imitation and thus reduces the incentive of the firms to invest in R&D. However,
at the same time, the more costly patent protection also encourages the specialist to conduct more
imitation. Hence, the effects of both variables induce an increase in the probability of successful
imitation.
Furthermore, we investigate the variables that would have influence on H’s R&D-activity level.
From the above equilibrium equation system, we can obtain:
Proposition 4. In equilibrium where outsourcing is conducted, the R&D-activity level k∗ is inde-
pendent of δRm+1.
This result is because k∗[βRm − f ′(k∗)] = c by substituting equation (5) into (6), which shows
that: in the monopolistically competitive market, keeping an advantage in R&D activities is im-
portant for a firm to survive; in other words, when a firm decides the investment in R&D activities,
even though there could exist a potential new entrant after outsourcing, the main consideration of a
firm is competition with other firms in the final-good market. Thus, it seems that firms’ investment
in R&D activities is likely to be engaged in a way as Bertrand competition, where the firm who
owns the most sophisticated technology (with highest level of k) possesses the entire final product
market, whereas other firms with lower level of technology are forced to leave the market because
they do not earn positive profits. In equilibrium where outsourcing is conducted, therefore, all firms
invest in the same R&D-activity level in order to survive in the market. This implies that market
competition with incumbents overweights the the potential threat from new market entrants, which
may explain why k∗ is independent of δRm+1.
3.2 Outsourcing versus in-house production
Now backward to the first stage, H has to make a decision between in-house production and
outsourcing. First, if H chooses to produce in house, it does not need to pay the patenting costs,
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but a relatively high discount of market profit will be incurred. Then the H’s revenue function,
when in-house production is chosen, is given by:
max
k
HIH = δRmk − f(k). (7)
Differentiating the above equation with respect to k, the optimal level of R&D activity is f ′−1(δRm),
and the maximized profit is such that HIH∗ = f ′−1(δRm)δRm − f(f ′−1(δRm)).
If H does outsourcing, its expected profit can be obtained by substituting equations (4) - (6)
into equation (2), such as:
H∗ = k∗[P ∗δRm+1 + (1− P ∗)βRm]− n∗c− f(k∗). (8)
Furthermore, we check the effect of the degree of inefficiency of intermediate-good production
on the choice of outsourcing for the firms. Given that k∗ is independent of δ in Proposition 3, we
obtain the following result:
Proposition 5. Given β and c, there exists a unique δ∗ such that, if δ ∈ [0, δ∗), outsourcing of the
intermediate goods is conducted in equilibrium; otherwise, in-house production is preferred by the
firms.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The result in Proposition 5 is intuitive: when δ is very small, H needs to pay a relatively
high profit discount for intermediate-good production, but by outsourcing H can avoid this cost
and raise its revenue, even if the imitation risk by O cannot be eliminated. In other words, the
marginal benefit from outsourcing is larger than the marginal risk of imitation. However, when δ
increases, the benefit from outsourcing gradually disappears. Critically, up to δ∗, the benefit from
avoiding the inefficiency of production cannot outweigh the risk of imitation, and then H switches to
production in house. This finding of the importance of inefficiency in intermediate-good production
is consistent with the findings of Aghion and Tirole (1997), Grossman and Helpman (2002), and
Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2003), who show that the cost of governance plays the main role
in the decision on outsourcing for firms.
4 Social welfare
From the above sections, we see that by introducing patent protection, even though it is costly,
information leakage and imitation possibility can be mitigated significantly. Patent protection in-
creases the incentive of the firms to outsource their intermediate goods and invest in R&D activities.
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In this case, by the firms outsourcing their intermediate goods, production can be organized in a
more efficient way with lower social cost. In the following, we discuss the policy implication.
The social planner can have impact on the willingness of the firms to outsource intermediate
goods and invest in R&D activity level via partially controlling the patenting cost. More specifically,
the patenting cost c can be classified into two parts: c = χ+C, where χ is the social cost associated
with money and time of patenting (which has to be paid by patent applicants), and C represents
a control variable charged by the social planner. Let C.Sm and C.Sm+1 represent the consumer
surplus of the demand faced by each firm in the markets with m and m+ 1 final-good producers,
respectively, and W denote the social welfare. Then we have that:
W = P (m+ 1)C.Sm+1 + (1− P )mC.Sm +mH +O, (9)
where the first two terms on the right of the equation represent the expected consumer surplus,
depending on the success of imitation by the specialist O, and the last two terms are the producer
surplus.
To focus on the policy implication, we normalize χ = 0 and check the effect of the patenting
cost on social welfare. The result shows that:
Proposition 6. When outsourcing is conducted, a reasonable level of patenting cost needs to be
imposed by the social planner so as to maximize total social welfare.
The proposition can be illustrated in details as follows. We omit the asterisk ∗ for the equilibrium
levels of n, k and P to avoid notational confusion. Given the demand function (y = Amp−), the
equilibrium price and quantity of the final products are equal to p = λµ/α and y = Am(λµ/α)
− 1
1−α
respectively, which yield C.Sm as follows:
C.Sm =
∫ Am(λµ/α)− 11−α
0
A1−αm y
−(1−α)dy −Am(λµ/α)−
α
1−α
= Am(λµ/α)
− α
1−α
(
1
α
− 1
)
=
1
α
Rmk,
recalling that Rm ≡ Am(1 − α)(1/α)−
α
1−α and k = (λµ)−
α
1−α . Similarly, C.Sm+1 = 1αRm+1k.
Obviously, we see that consumers are better off when the firms invest more in R&D activity (cost-
cutting technology), namely, ∂C.S/∂k = 1αR > 0. This also implies that consumer surplus decreases
when c increases, i.e., C.S′(c) = ∂C.S∂k
∂k
∂c < 0.
Then by differentiating equation (9) with respect to c, we obtain the first order condition of W
with respect to c:
∂W
∂c
= (m+1)
1
α
kRm+1
∂P
∂c
+(m+1)
1
α
PRm+1
∂k
∂c
+m
1
α
(1−P )Rm∂k
∂c
−m 1
α
kRm
∂P
∂c
+m
∂H
∂c
+
∂O
∂c
= 0.
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After simplifying the algebra and substitution, we obtain that:
∂W
∂c
= m
(
A∂P
∂c
+ B∂k
∂c
− n
)
= 0, (10)
where
A ≡
(
1
m
+ δ +
m+ 1
m
1
α
)
kRm+1 −
{
f ′(k) + c
[
2e−2γnτ − f ′′(k)
4e−2γnkτ
]}
2[δRm+1 − βRm]
f ′′(k)
> 0,
and
B ≡
(
δ +
m+ 1
m
1
α
)
PRm+1
+
[
1
α
(1− P ) + 1− Pβ
]
Rm +
1
m
P (Rm+1 − (1− β)mRm)
[
2e−2γnτ − f ′′(k)
4e−2γn
τ
]
> 0.
The derivation of equation (10) is present in the Appendix. Given that A, B, and ∂P/∂c are
positive, and ∂k/∂c is negative, equation (10) shows that when the social welfare is maximized, a
positive level of c needs to be taxed by the social planner.
The interpretation of Proposition 6 can be stated as follows: the social planner faces a trade-off
when she adjusts c. When c increases, on the one hand, H has to decrease its number of patents in
protection, which increases the probability of successful imitation for O. In this case, the final-good
market is likely to switch to an m+ 1-firm market, and consumers are better off from the increase
in quantity competition of the products. In the meantime, technological diffusion is achieved. On
the other hand, an increase in c may discourage H to invest in R&D activities, which consequently
reduces the consumer surplus.12 Thus, there should exist a upper bound C for c. In contrast, when
c decreases, the above argument reverses, then there should exist a lower bound C for c. Therefore,
depending on these effects of c, the social planner consequently has to decide a socially optimal
value c within the interval [C,C] if it exists.
5 Conclusions
Concluding remarks. In this article, the aim is to investigate how firms make the decisions on
“outsourcing and in-house production” and R&D investment, when unavoidable information leakage
may induce imitation from intermediate-good specialists. We show that by using patent protection,
even if it is costly, outsourcing of the intermediate goods can still be conducted. In equilibrium
12In fact, an intuitive assumption which has been made in this model is that (m + 1)C.Sm+1 > mC.Sm. This
implies that the more firms there are in the market, the higher consumer surplus will be created. However, if
(m+ 1)C.Sm+1 ≤ mC.Sm, the maximized social welfare may be achieved with c = 0 and n =∞. This is because in
this case, technological progress (k) plays a more important role in the increase in social welfare.
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where outsourcing is conducted, all firms, in order to minimize the probability of successful imitation
and avoid severe potential competition, tend to outsource their intermediate goods to a single
specialist. In addition, each firm still invests in R&D activities and outsources its intermediate
goods with a certain degree of patent protection, even though the specialist will put some effort
into imitation and the possibility of successful imitation is positive in outsourcing. Furthermore,
we show that in this equilibrium, the firms’ investment level of innovation only depends on the
patenting cost, their bargaining power, and the m-firm profit.
Moreover, we have also examined the role of inefficiency of producing intermediate goods when
the firms make the decision on “outsourcing or in-house production”. We show that given a bar-
gaining power and the patenting cost, the firms choose to outsource their intermediate goods if
the discounting factor is small enough, namely, the degree of inefficiency of producing the inter-
mediate goods is sufficiently large. Lastly, we discuss social welfare and the policy implication of
outsourcing. In the outsourcing market, the social planner faces the tradeoff between technology
diffusion and R&D investment. Strong patent protection (charging a low patenting cost) encour-
ages R&D investment but reduces the possibility of technology diffusion and competition in the
final-good market, which consequently decreases consumer surplus, and vice versa. We show that
to maximize social welfare, a reasonable level of patenting cost may need to be charged when the
firms choose to outsource their intermediate goods.
Further research. The model presented in this article may be extended in several theoretical
directions for future research. Firstly, further work could consider imitation from the specialist
in a dynamic environment. In that setting, if the specialist fails in the current imitation, it may
try again in the following stages. Or, even if imitation is successful, the specialist still needs more
periods to enter the final-good market. Then, it would be interesting to check whether our results
still hold in this dynamic setting. Another interesting extension may be to consider the research
capability of the specialist after successful imitation. If the specialist cannot undertake further
innovations, it is still difficult for it to survive in the final-good competition, given that firms in
the final product market may engage in a head-to-head Bertrand competition for R&D activities
as the case in Proposition 4. Under this circumstance, the specialist may have less incentive to put
effort into imitation at the beginning of the game.
Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: We solve the model by backward induction. In the second
stage, the specialist decides how much effect (θ) should be put into the non-infringement imitation,
namely, the best response of the specialist. Taking the first-order condition (F.O.C) with respect
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to θ so as to maximize O’s profit, we have:
∂O
∂θ
= 0, and thus θ∗ =
be−γnk[Rm+1 − (1− β)mRm]
cθ
. (11)
Given Assumption 1, equation (11) shows that θ∗ is positive, which means that the specialist always
invests in imitation, but the imitation investment θ∗ lowers as the number of patents n increases.13
Given the imitation investment θ∗ by the specialist O, in the first stage H’s expected payoff
function in outsourcing is given by:
H(n, k, θ∗) = k[bθ∗e−γnδRm+1 + (1− bθ∗e−γn)βRm]− nc− f(k), (12)
where the number of patents n and the R&D-activity level k are chosen by H. We take F.O.C for
maximizing the profit of H with respect to n and k separately:
∂H
∂n
= 0 and
∂H
∂k
= 0. (13)
Thus, the best response (n∗, k∗) is determined by the following equation system:14
−2γe−2γn∗(k∗)2τ = c, and (14)
2e−2γn
∗
k∗τ + βRm − f ′(k∗) = 0, (15)
where τ = b
2(Rm+1−(1−β)mRm)(δRm+1−βRm)
cθ
< 0.
Apparently, the existence and uniqueness of the solution are also satisfied. Thus, we can con-
clude that the strategy profile (n∗, k∗, θ∗) consists of a unique solution if outsourcing is conducted.
This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: Differentiating equations (14) and (15) with respect to c,
and with the asterisk ∗ of the variables omitted for convenience, we have the partial differential
equation system as follows:
4e−2nk2γ2τ
∂n
∂c
− 4e−2γnkτ ∂k
∂c
= 1, and (16)
−4e−2γnkτ ∂n
∂c
+ (2e−2γnτ − f ′′(k))∂k
∂c
= 0. (17)
13The second order condition is satisfied because ∂
2O
∂θ2
= −cθ < 0.
14The second order conditions are satisfied as ∂
2H
∂n2
= 4γ2e−2γnk2τ < 0, and ∂
2H
∂k2
= 2e−2γnτ − f ′′(k) < 0.
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Solving equations (17) and (16), we obtain that:
∂n
∂c
=
2e−2γnτ − f ′′(k)
−4e−2γnk2γ2τ [f ′′(k) + 2e−2γnτ ] , and (18)
∂k
∂c
=
−1
kγ[f ′′(k) + 2e−2γnτ ]
. (19)
Intuitively, when c increases, it becomes more costly for a firm to apply for patent protection in
outsourcing, and then the number of patents n will decrease. This implies that equation (18) should
be less than zero, namely, ∂n∂c < 0, which also yields that:
[f ′′(k) + 2e−2γnτ ] > 0. (20)
Obviously, from equation (20), the sign of equation (19) can be determined as ∂k∂c < 0. The
R&D-activity level decreases as the patenting cost increases.
In the following, we check the signs of change in θ and P , when c increases. First, differentiating
θ with respect to c and substituting ∂n∂c and
∂k
∂c into the differential equation give that:
∂θ
∂c
=
[
∂k
∂c
− kγ ∂n
∂c
]
e−γnb(Rm+1 − (1− β)mRm)
cθ
=
[
f ′′(k)− 2e−2γnτ
−4e−2γnkγτ(f ′′(k) + 2e−2γnτ) −
1
kγ(f ′′(k) + 2e−2γnτ)
]
e−γnb(Rm+1 − (1− β)mRm)
cθ
=
b(Rm+1 − (1− β)mRm)
−4e−γnkγτcθ > 0.
(21)
Furthermore, differentiating P with respect to c and substituting ∂n∂c and
∂θ
∂c into the differential
equation yield:
∂P
∂c
=
(
∂θ
∂c
− ∂n
∂c
γθ
)
e−γnb
=
b2(Rm+1 − (1− β)mRm)
−4kγτcθ
[
1− 2e
−2γnτ − f ′′(k)
f ′′(k) + 2e−2γnτ
]
=
b2f ′′(k)(Rm+1 − (1− β)mRm)
−2kγτcθ(f ′′(k) + 2e−2γnτ) > 0.
(22)
Thus, when the patenting cost increases, the effort of imitation by the specialist and the corre-
sponding probability of successful imitation increase. The proof is complete. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: We prove the effect of δ in this proposition by (i) investi-
gating the monotonicity of H∗(δ) and HIH∗(δ), and (ii) checking their boundaries at δ = 0, 1.
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Again, the asterisk ∗ of the variables k, n, P and θ is dropped for convenience.
Part (i): First of all, k is independent of δ according to Proposition 4. Then, by differentiating
equations (14) - (15) with respect to δ, we have:
4e−2γnk2γ2τ
∂n
∂δ
− 2e−2γnk2γ ∂τ
∂δ
= 0 and, (23)
−4e−2γnkγτ ∂n
∂δ
+ 2e−2γnk
∂τ
∂δ
= 0. (24)
Given that ∂τ/∂δ = b
2(Rm+1−(1−β)mRm)
cθ
Rm+1 > 0 and τ < 0, equations (23) and (24) immediately
imply the following:
∂n
∂δ
=
1
2γτ
∂τ
∂δ
=
b2Rm+1(Rm+1 − (1− β)mRm)
2τγcθ
< 0. (25)
Furthermore, replicating the above method for θ and P , we obtain:
∂θ
∂δ
= −kγ
(
∂n
∂δ
)
e−γnb(Rm+1 − (1− β)mRm)
cθ
= −kb
3e−γnRm+1(Rm+1 − (1− β)mRm)2
2τc2θ
> 0 and
(26)
∂P
∂δ
=
(
∂θ
∂δ
− ∂n
∂δ
θ
)
e−γnb = −kb
4e−2γnRm+1(Rm+1 − (1− β)mRm)2
τc2θ
> 0. (27)
The effect of δ on H∗ is:
∂H∗
∂δ
= k
[
∂P
∂δ
δRm+1 + PRm+1 − ∂P
∂δ
βRm
]
− c∂n
∂δ
, (28)
Then, substituting equations (26) and (27) into equation (28) yields that ∂H
∗
∂δ = −c∂n∂δ > 0, namely,
H∗ is increasing in δ.
When the firm chooses in-house production, the maximized expected payoff is such that HIH∗ =
f ′−1(δRm)δRm − f(f ′−1(δRm)), and taking its derivative with respect to δ gives: ∂HIH∗/∂δ =
Rm
f ′′−1(δRm)
[
Rm
δ + f
′′(δRm)
(
f ′−1(δRm)− 1
)]
> 0. Thus, HIH∗ is increasing in δ.
Part (ii): It is now to check the boundaries of H∗ and HIH∗: When δ = 0, k > 1 gives that
HIH∗(0) = −f(f ′−1(0)) ≤ 0, whereas from equation (25), H∗(0) = k[(1−P )βRm]−nc− f(k) > 0.
Thus H∗(0) > HIH∗(0). In contrast, when δ = 1, from equations (2) and (3), Rm+1 < Rm and
β < 1 yield:
H(1) = k[PRm+1 + (1− P )βRm]− nc− f(k)
< k[PRm+1 + (1− P )Rm]− nc− f(k) < kRm − f(k) = HIH(1).
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Therefore,
H∗(1) = max
k,n
H(1) < max
k
HIH(1) = HIH∗(1).
To summarize, given that both H∗ and HIH∗ are increasing in δ, and H∗(0) > HIH∗(0) and
H∗(1) < HIH∗(1), the intermediate value theorem implies that there exists a unique threshold δ∗
so that H∗(δ∗) = HIH∗(δ∗) and outsourcing is conducted if δ ∈ [0, δ∗). The proof is complete.15
Q.E.D.
DERIVATION OF ∂W/∂c: we substitute the following expressions into the first order con-
dition of equation (10) with respect to c:
∂P
∂c
=
f ′′(k)
2[δRm+1 − βRM ]
∂k
∂c
,
∂H
∂c
=
∂k
∂c
[PδRm+1 + (1− P )βRm] + k
[
∂P
∂c
δRm+1 − ∂P
∂c
βRm
]
− c∂n
∂c
− f ′(k)∂k
∂c
− n, and
∂O
∂c
=
∂k
∂c
[PδRm+1 + (1− P )(1− β)mRm] + k
[
∂P
∂c
δRm+1 − ∂P
∂c
(1− β)mRm
]
− cθθ∂θ
∂c
.
Consequently, by using that ∂θ∂c =
[
∂k
∂c − kγ ∂n∂c
] e−γnb(Rm+1−(1−β)mRm)
cθ
, ∂W/∂c can be calculated as:
∂W
∂c
=
[(
1
m
+ δ +
m+ 1
m
1
α
)
Rm+1 −
(
1
α
+ 1
)
Rm
]
mk
∂P
∂c
+
[(
δ +
m+ 1
m
1
α
)
PRm+1 +
(
1
α
+ 1
)
(1− P )Rm + P (1− β)Rm − f ′(k)
]
m
∂k
∂c
+
[
1
m
PkγRm+1 − P (1− β)kγRm − c
]
m
∂n
∂c
−mn = 0.
(29)
We then restrict our focus on the effects of c on P and k. From the above Appendix, we also can
write ∂n/∂c as ∂n/∂c = [2e−2γnτ − f ′′(k)]/ [4e−2γnkγτ] (∂k/∂c). Substituting this relation into
equation (29) yields ∂W∂c = m
(A∂P∂c + B ∂k∂c − n) = 0. Q.E.D.
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